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KYBERNETIKA —VOLUME 12 (1976), NUMBER 3 
Time Change of Objects and Problem 
of their Identification 
ROMAN BEK 
In present paper will be proposed a way of defining of time — terms within exact language. 
In such languages it is possible under some conditions, to solve the problem of "paradoxies 
of identity" for developing objects. One form of definition both of the timeterms and the relati-
vised identity serves as the starting point for it. 
I. 
In this paper we will deal with some questions concerned with the time identifica-
tion of physical objects undergoing time changes. The discourse will be concerned 
with relations between extralogical constants of a theoretical language and their 
denotates i.e. physical objects. Through sentences of a language we give statements 
on the properties of objects and on relations the objects enter. Assuming the perma-
nent change of objects we are confronted with the problem of the truth of corres-
ponding statements. 
Let the object b have the property F at the time tt. We describe this fact by the 
sentence 
(I/D F(b,tt) 
and this sentence is a true sentence of the language concerned. 
Further let 
(1/2) G(b,tj), tt*tj 
be an another sentence of the language. If we are to verify the truth of the other 
sentence we have to assign the same object to the constant b that was the denotate 
in the interpretation of the sentence (i/l). Then the question comes: Does there exist 
the same object at the time tj that was spoken about in the sentence (l/l) and that was 
identifiable through its properties at the time tt. 
152 If we accept the Leibniz's idea of identity (i.e. the object existing at the time tt 
denoted by b in the sentence (1/1) is identical with the object existing at the time tj 
and denoted by b in (1/2)) then we have to admit that the object did not experience 
any changes in the closed time interval <f;, tj} i.e. it did not change any of its pro-
perties. If we are not inclined to accept a completely nonintuitive and empirically 
unverified assumption that physical objects do not change at all in their history, 
then we are moved to make the conclusion on the discrete character of time changes 
of objects, so that these objects do not change any of their properties in the course 
of certain time intervals and then they change some (at least) of their properties 
instantly. 
(1/3) Vify <t<tj-> (VF F(b, t) A W(tj <t-* BG(~G(b, t) A G(b, t'))))) 
The sentence (1/3) drives us to a problem similar to that one above if the denotate 
of the constant b does not posses the priperty G in the time interval <f;, tj} and if the 
denotate of the constant b in the formula G(b, t') does posses the property G at the 
time tj then — from the Leibniz's point of view — we are delaing with different 
objects and by using the same symbol in all parts of the sentence (1/3) we offended 
against the uniteness of notation law. 
This reasoning brings us to the following conclusion: When keeping the Leibniz's 
idea of identity we have to accept either the absolute invariability of objects through-
out the world history or we have to take that a physical object becomes an another after 
its single property is changed; then in an exact language it must be denoted by an 
another constant. 
The first metaphysical alternative is nonintuitive and it is easy to falsify it in an 
empirical way. The other alternative is drawing us to enormous complications in the 
area of language: every developing phase of an object should be denoted by a special 
extralogical constant accordingly. There should be as many extralogical constants as 
there are time changes in the history of an objects. So there would appear a set 
of distinct symbols for an object in any sentence speaking about a finite section 
in the history of the physical object. Suppose a sentence speaks about a variable 
metric quantity of a property of an object where the quantities assume rational 
numerical values, then for its complete formulation a countably infinite set of con-
stants must be used. 
If we use a variable for this purpose (the region of which is the class of the phases 
of the object changing in time) we have to use a term denoting a characteristic of the 
object unchanged in the section of the history concerned. 
Suppose a sentence on the change of the magnitude of some property of an object 
in a given limited part of its history has the form 
(1/4) V ^ e f f - F , ) 
where Vfi is a sentence in which free variable /? occurs; H — the region of the variable 
P — is characterized through a property of the object that remained unchanged 
through the given part of its history. As far as this property is concerned the diffi-
culties mentioned above remain if we want to deal with a series of subsequent parts 
of the history of the object, that are defined through changes of properties by which 
the regions of individual variables were defined. 
The difficulties mentioned were dealt with by a good number of authors recently. 
In the following part of the paper I will seek possible solutions following the ideas 
of [2]. The solutions will be sought through a certain approach to the concept 
of "time" and through a relativisation of the concept of "identity". 
II. 
The difficulties mentioned in the part I are obviously connected with the variability 
of ontological entities spoken about in the languages or rigorous science. A language 
system unable — due to its structure — of the description of time changes is obviously 
inadequate for the purpose given. For this reason we will be dealing with a language 
system in whose sentences speaking about separate time events time terms — con-
stants and variables — can occur. In the examples given above this sort of expres-
sions was used yet. It was automatically supposed that the time structure spoken 
about was linear, metric and additive [6]. In the paper [6] also another time struc-
tures are studied. In the following reasonings I will seek a general solution; it will 
always be pointed out when a special time structure is being dealt with. 
It is possible to give an interpretation of an exact language in a time structure 
that contains either an at most countable or an uncountable class of time points. 
First let us deal with a language the universe of which contains an at most count-
able time structure as a part. Its elements — time points — are denoted by time 
constants that make an at most countable set. By such a language we are to give an 
adequate description of time changes of physical objects that are at most countable 
too. If a quantified language is dealt with (in which relations between metric magni-
tudes of object properties are spoken about) then its mathematical formalism must 
not use operations leading to irrational values. This requirement is certainly not 
met by the language of classical physics based on theorems of classical mathematical 
analysis. On the other hand the requirement is obviously met by the language based 
on finite numerical mathematics. 
Suppose a language J] describing just time changes of an object b is given. If we 
are to describe n different time changes of the object (e.g. changes of magnitude 
of a property A) then in the general case the alphabet of J] must contain at least n 
different time constants tu t2, t3,..., t„ along with relevant predicate constants. 
Suppose further a language J] describing just time changes of metric magnitudes 
of a property A of an object b is given, where there are relations among the magnitudes. 
These relations are exponential functions. The alphabet of the language J] must 
contain the real time variable in the general case then. 
Languages of described types can be built up in two ways as a matter of fact. 
In the first case we introduce time constants as primitive individual constants. 
While interpreting a language built up in this way we have to accept the universe 
nonhomogeneous in that it contains objects the time changes of which we describe 
and time instants at the same time. In the other case we introduce time constants 
in the course of construction of the language through definitions where some pre-
dicate constants denoting periodically variable properties of an object chosen as 
a chronometer appear in the definiendum. 
(i) In the first case the existence and character of the time structure is postulated. 
According to [6] in this case "time point" is a contents deprived case of events . . . 
time is not individualized by events, events can be distinguished by means of time. 
Times are prior to events logically because events can be differentiated a identified 
only with reference to time". 
Fig. 1. Ä. 
In the connection given they sometimes speak of an "absolute approach to time". 
An advantage of this approach is that while choosing postulates through which we 
speak of the character of time structure we are not bound by respects to the character 
of events described by the language as closely as it is in the other case. In [6] the 
author lays stress on the fact that by this approach to time we may assume time 
structures inadmissible for the other approach (the nonlinear time structure of the 
form given in Fig. 1 for example). Among the disadvantages of the "absolute approach 
to time" the above discussed nonhomogeneousness of the language universe of the 
language should be mentioned. 
(ii) In the other case time constants of the language can be defined in two ways: 
(a) In the first case descriptions of individual events are used for the definition. 
In the class of events a relation "to take place simultaneously" is defined. 
Time points are then identified with abstraction classes formed through this 
relation (which obviously is one of equivalence type). 
In paper [1] the following form of the definition of an "event time" appears. 
"Let S = {x, y, z, ...} be a class of events; let R be the relation "to take 
place simultaneously". Then the definition of the "time point at which the 
event x comes" is: 
Def |x| = y(yeS A R(X, y)) . 
(b) In the other case descriptions of isolated processes are used for the definition 
of time constants. In a class of processes S' = {p, q,r,...} a relation R' of 
being time equal is defined. Time intervals are defined as abstraction classes 155 
of S' with respect to the relation R': 
Def \p\ = q\q eS' A R'(p, q)) . 
In [1] the author prefers the first type of the definition of time constants. He 
points out difficulties coming when the other way is followed: "events" cannot be 
defined through "processes"; "time points" cannot be defined through "time inter-
vals" while the contrary procedure is possible. 
In the connection with the approach (ii) they often speak about a "relativistic 
approach to time" [6]. It should be admitted that this approach inevitably implies 
complications of the syntactic structure of the language (definitions are introduced 
and relevant definition axioms are accepted). The interpretation of a language built 
in this way appears to be simpler from the following point of view: the class of time 
points (time intervals resp.) need not be established - contrary to the case of a lan-
guage built in the first way. Ontology of the language is more complicated on the 
other hand. Time points (intervals resp.) are denoted by the first order predicate 
constants; classes of events (processes resp.), relations between time points (intervals 
resp.) are denoted by second order predicate constants. Using the approach (i) on the 
other hand time constants can be considered as a special kind of individual constants 
and relations between the time points can be denoted as first order predicate con-
stants. 
Let us go back to language of the type Jt by which time changes of objects are 
described. On acceptance of the "absolute approach to time" (i) time terms as pri-
mitive terms of the language are introduced and postulates are chosen so that they 
convey with the character of the region of physical reality to be described. The 
language of classical physics originating from the idea of time continuum would 
postulate in this approach the existence of an uncountable class of time points 
ordered by a connective relation "to take place earlier than". Individual time points 
would be assigned real numbers by metrization. Time structure (defined as an ordered 
pair of the class of time points and the order relation "to take place earlier than") 
would appear to be (through the postulates) linear, metric and additive. 
Such a language should provide for a description of continuous time changes 
of properties of physical objects. If a language like this is built on the base of predicate 
logic with identity (using the Leibniz's approach to identity) the difficulties mentioned 
above would come. If we resign on the assumption of continuity of time changes 
of object properties, then of course the language with the postulated time structure 
appears to be too strong but there is no need to turn our back to it on this ground. 
Suppose now that the "relativistic approach to time" was chosen for the construc-
tion of a type Jt language. It is easy to show that the definition of the "event time" 
puts some requirements on the choice of time structure of the language. 
Events will be understood now as states of an object characterized by a certain 
(passing) property of the object. 
156 Suppose there is an object ct with the property I*'
1. The event then is the state 
of the object described by the sentence: T*"^^). 
Suppose further that Tk'1 is a subclass of the class T decomposable into mutually 
disjoint subclasses T1, T2,..., Tk,... and each of the subclasses is again decompos-
able into disjoint subclasses T1'1, T1'2,..., T2-1, T2'2,..., TM, T*-2,..., TM,.... 
Let all subclasses of both kinds be ordered by the relation RT (Fig. 2). These sub-
T1.1T1,2 _ pT2.1T2.2... , . . . T M T W . . . TW ... . 
T1 T2 ii 
y— 
Fig. 2 . 
classes will be understood (due to the extensionality principle) as properties of the 
objects cx, c2, c3, . . . belonging to the class C. The class C will be interpreted 
as the property "to be a given particular chronometer"; individual classes 
T1'1, T1,2,... wil be understood as distinct characteristics of the chronometer by 
which time is measured. If for example the chronometer is a certain quantity of 
a radioactive material, then the objects cu c2,... are understood to be quantities 
of the material at particular stages of decomposition and classes T1'1, T1'2,... are 
understood to be the properties "one half of the original quantity is decomposed", 
"one half of the remaining half of the original quantity is decomposed", etc. 
Under these assumptions languages of the type Jt with "the relativistic approach 
to time" can be built now. 
Language JT in that "event time" is defined 
In the score of primitive constants of the language there are first order predicate 
constants: 
T, 
rp\ rp2 rp3 
rpl,l rpl,2 rpl,3 
j-2,1 y2,2 rp2,3 
rp3,l rp3,2 rp3,3 
where each of the classes denoted this way is a proper subclass of the class denoted T; 
further there are individual constants ct, c2, c3, ••• and one-place predicate first order 
constant C so that it holds cu c2,...eC; further a two-place second order predicate 
constant RT denoting the order relation for proper subclasses of the class T, further 
there is a functor fT together with an identity) in the Leibniz's sense notation. 
Further let the language contain the arithmetic of naturals. 
Let in the language the following sentence holds: 
(II/1) VT'm VTJ> Vc' Vc"((T'''m(c') A TJ'"(c")) -> VE(F | T ^ (E(c') «-• F(c")))) 
c',c"eC 
(The sentence (II/1) states in the interpretation intended that objects of the class C 
are identified on the base of all of their properties with the exception for the properties 
of the type TM.) 
Let us introduce definitions of the form 
(D II/1) Def ttJc) *-> 3T''
mr-m(c) 
By these definitions names of time points identified with subclasses of the type Tk'' 
are introduced into the language. The definitions conform with the definition of the 
"event time" from [1] under assumption that the "chronometer" concept is specified 
through a given property C exclusively. 
Let us define further on 
(D II/2) Def *;,ra <
 TtJiM «-» 3T''-




By the definition notation of an order relation on the class of time points is introduced. 




(fT should be understood as a notation for a function mapping the class of time 
points in the class of natural numbers now and the sentence (II/2) provides for the 
ordinal type of the scale of numerical magnitudes of individual time points. 
Let us introduce definitions of the form 
(D II/3) Def AtmJ„ = S <-» 3f;,m 3tJ>(S(/;,m) A S(tM) A /,-,,„ <
 Ttjt„ A 
A ~3tkt0 3tltP(S(tkt0) A S(thp) A tki0 <
 Tt-um A iu„ <
 Ttl>p)) 
By these definitions notations of individual time intervals as closed intervals of time 
points are introduced. 
Language JP in that "process time" is defined. 
The language contains the same primitive constants as the language \\ with the 
exception for the functor fT in place of which the functor gT is introduced. The 
language contains the arithmetic of naturals too. 
In the language the concept of a "process" is defined. The process will be considered 
as an ordered pair <Al, AJ> of classes A1, AJ that are proper subclasses of the class A 
that are ordered by the relation RA here. These subclasses are understood to be 
properties of objects bu b2, ... belonging to the class B: 
(D II/4) Def <A !, AJ>*roc«-» 3b' 3b"(A'(b') A A
J(b") A 
b',b"sB 
A RA(A\ AJ) A VE(E J A -» (F(b') <-> F(b")))) 
(A pair of classes <A', AJ> is said to be a "process from the point of view of the class 
B" iff these classes are ordered by the relation RA and are properties of objects from 
the class B identified by all of their properties with the exception for those belonging 
to the class A. Thus a process is understood to be a change of a property of some 
object while this change is oriented in some direction.) 
For the subclasses of the class Tand for objects of the class C it holds in particular 
(II/3) <T ' '-, TJ>>^roc<-+ 3c' 3c"(T""(c') A P'"(c") A R\T'
m, TJ'") A 
c',c"eC 
A VF(F £ T - (E(c') <-> F(c")))) 
Let us now introduce definitions of the form 
(D II/5) BdAtimJn = <T
i-m, TJ''"> -> 3c' 3c"«r - m , P'")ctoe A T'
m(c') A TJ'"(C")) 
c',c"sC 
By these definitions names of time intervals — identified with processes involving 
objects of the class C (chronometer) passed through due to oriented changes or 
properties of the type TM — are introduced. These definitions correspond with the 
definition of "process time" form [1] under the assumption that the concept of 
"chronometer" is specified by a particular property C. 
Further a concept of "time interval summation" is introduced. Behind it a forma-
tion of a class containing just all subclasses of the type Tk'1 contained in the interval 
of subclasses of this type through which time interval was defined, is understood: 
(DII/6) Def 2A*.w,/» = V ~ 3T
1"" 3TJ'"(AtimJn = (T-
m, TJ-") A 
A 3T i '"'+13T i-m + 2 . . . 3T i-m+01 
3 j i + l , l 1)7^+1,2 jjjJ-i+1,02 
37,>+",l 3 j i + n,2 _ ^Ti + n,o„+i 
3TJ>1 3TJ'2 ... 3TJ'0n*~z 
(~ 3Ti-m+'" + 1 RT^Ti,m0i + l^ Ti + i,ij A 
A ~ 3J"- + 1,»2 + 1 RT/Ti+l,o2 + l^ Ti + 2,1\ A 
. . . A „ 1Ti + n,on+1 + l ^ J ' i + »,o„+1+l j p.lj A 
A ~ 3TJ,o„ + 2 + l RT/TJ,on + 2 + l^ p,n\\ A 
A U = {T''m, Ti,m + 1 , ..., P'1, ..., P'"\) . 
In scheme we get Fig. 3. 
R T 159 
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Fig. 3. 
Further let us introduce definitions of the form: 
(D II/7) Def u(AtimJn) = NC ^AtimJn 
by which the number of elements (cardinality) of the class, the summation of the 
given interval, is defined. 
Further the definition 
(D II/8) Def AtimJ„ <TAtkojp <-* 3p. 3v2(vt = u(AtimJn) A V2 = u(Atk0:lp) A 
A t j < V2) 
is introduced. 
Let in the language a sentence enabling us to measure magnitudes of time intervals 
(U/4) 9T{AhmJn) = u(AtimJn) 
be given. (By this sentence the number equal to the number of elements of its summa­
tion is assigned by the function named gT to each time interval. In the interpretation 
intended this number gives the duration length of the interval. It is obvious that 
the magnitude of the time unit of duration is given by the norm of the decomposi­
tion of the class Tinto classes of the type Tk'1. 
Additivity of the introduced time structure is assured by the next sentence (H/5) 
if required. Let us define the "union of two time intervals" first: 
(D II/9) JMAttoj. +TAtkoJp = AtimJp <-> 3U. 3U2 3U3(U! = 5 > t a J i l A 
. A U2 = Y
AtkoJp A U3 = Y.
Atim,lp A 
A U3 = 17, U U2) 
160 The postulated sentence on additivity is 
(n/5) gT(^imJn +-.-.**...-) - g
T(AtimJn) + g
T(AtkoJp) 
In the languages under construction names of time points can be defined by defini-
tions of the form 
(D 11/10) Def tim = v «-> 3AtkoJp(v e £J.*„,,,) 
now. (Thus time point is defined as an element of the summation class of a given 
interval.) 
It obviously follows from the sentences and definitions presented that the term 
"time interval" can be defined in the ranks of the language J" so that it meets all 
requirements formulated in the language Jf. Similarly on the other hand the term 
"time point" can be defined within the language Jf so that it meets all requirements 
formulated by the sentences of the language J". Hence there is no need in prefering 
one approach to "relativistic time" to the other one. 
Sentences in both kinds of languages obviously hold if finiteness of the number 
of subclasses of the type TM of the class Tis assumed. The conclusions reached can 
be generalized for the countable cardinality of subclasses of the class Tin the follow-
ing way. 
(1) We will prove that the conclusions hold when the class T is decomposed into 
two subclasses T1, T2 where each of the subclasses is decomposed in another two 
T1'1, T1*2, T2-1, T2'2 again. 
(2) Further it will be proved: Suppose the conclusions hold for decompositions 
of the class T into n subclasses of the type Tk where each of them is decomposed 
into /„ subclasses of the type Tk'l° (1 :g o :g n) again, then the conclusions hold for 
any decomposition of T into (n + 1) subclasses of the type Tk and also for decom-
positions of each of the subclasses into /0 + 1 subclasses of the type T
k,l°*'. 
It should be agreed upon that the identification of a time point with the whole 
of a subclass of the type T;,m (where further decomposability is not excluded) is not 
very intuitive from the traditional point of view. We are tempted to consider time 
points as sections in time intervals from this traditional standpoint. Under assumption 
of the "relativistic approach to time" there are considerable troubles implied by 
the "event" definition of "time points" understood in this way. In the definition 
from (l) mentioned above it is supposed in view of the interpretation intended that 
we are able to verify the condition "the event x took place simultaneously with the 
event y". Of course this sentence is unverifiable in the strict sense of word due to the 
finiteness of our observing and measuring capacity. If verifiability in certain (his-
torically given) tolerance limits in stating simultaneousness is admitted, then we arrive 
exactly at the same concept of "time point" as used in the languages J", }"t suggested. 
The difficulties mentioned appear to be still more obvious iff the given concept 
of an "event" is taken for the start point. Definitions of the "time point" of the form 
(D 11/2) would need the continuous character of changes of the property T of the 
chronometer C. If on the other hand the objects c1; c2, c 3 , . . . (considered as develop-
ment stages of the chronometer) are identical by the sentence (11/1) in all their 
properties with the exception for those of the class T(phases of the property change T) 
then uncountably many such objects must be considered. Statements of the form 
Tk'\c) are unverifiable in an empirical way and the chance of "exact recognition 
of what time is right now by chronometer" is lost. Hence it seems that the author 
of [1] is not quite right when he prefers the "event approach". Difficulties appear 
not only at the stage where the "time point" should be defined but also much sooner 
when explanation of what it actually is an "event" and the question of how to describe 
it in an exact language are asked. 
In the course of construction of the languages J", Jf we have mentioned a possible 
definition of the "time point" by which these make an at most countable class. 
Classical physics on the other hand takes on the hypothesis of time-continuum just 
at this start point. Suggested languages give us a chance of a step by step growth 
of density of the class of time points by further decomposition of subclasses of the 
type TM. (The subclass T''m can be — for example — further decomposed into 
another two subclasses T'm'1, T'm'2 and these again into subclasses Ti'm'1'1, T'mA'2, 
T',m'2,1,...) When building up the language this will be reflected in growing numbers 
of primitive constants TM, TM,i etc. 
If potentially unlimited decomposability of any of the subclasses of the class T 
is assumed then a way to the time-continuum may be looked upon as a limiting 
process of decompositions of subclasses of the class T. The assumption of such 
unlimited decomposability is unverifiable in an empirical way of course. It must be 
postulated in the metalanguage by which the construction of the type ]t languages 
is described. The aim is to get sentences specific for the continuous character of the 
class of time points in the language constructed for the "relativistic approach to 
time". The language built would be enriched by new postulates then. A sentence 
on connectivity of the relation RT in the class of all thinkable subclasses of the class 
T could be postulated for example. This of course would bring some formal changes 
in some other sentences of the language. 
In traditional discourses a linear, metric and additive character of the time struc-
ture was mostly assumed. There is no need in keeping this assumption when construct-
ing languages in suggested ways. The specific character of the time structure where 
time points and time intervals are defined in suggested ways can be assured by means 
of further postulates through which the meaning of the term RT denoting the order 
relation for subclasses of the class Tand that of the t e r m / r (gT resp.) through which 
the metric character of the time structure is postulated. 
By means of specific postulates e.g. a nonlinear character of the class of time 
points, additive or nonadditive character of the time metric can be given. 
162 The circular character of the class of time points in the case of languages discussed 
with an at most countable class of subclasses of T could be formulated by an addi­
tional postulate of the form: 
"There is i and m so that it holds: 
{[if/c * .,/ 4= mthen:VTk'l3Tk-l+1RT(TkJ, Tk-l+1), if Tk>1 is not the last subclass 
of the class Tin order RT) and simultaneously VTM 3 T t + 1 4 Rr(TM, j * + 1 - 1 ) 
if TM is the last subclass of the class Tk in order R7)] and simultaneously 
Rr(T''m, T1'1)}. 
In scheme, see Fig. 4. 
In all cases of the languages there holds a sentence a modification of which gives 




- t i m = y . * 
TJ-"(c)) л T;'m = T7'") 
Let us note that due to the definitions given in J", JP the "relativists" need not refuse 
the time structure of the form shown in Fig. 1 as Rescher states in [6]. Let the class T 
ordered in this way be of the form given in Fig. 5. The form is specified by giving 
Fig. 4. Fig. 5. 
particular postulates in the languages. The point of intersection O need not mean that 
in the corresponding time point an object must have and need not have a given 
property at the same time. In our approach where time points are identified not 
with the points but with the classes it is certainly possible to describe e.g. the follow­
ing changes of properties of the object b so that the contradiction law is respected: 
F(b, tt.lt0) A F(b, r u ) A ... A F(b, tJ>m) A ~F(ft, I-J + L O . 
Hence we need not prefer the "absolute approach to time" as stated in [6]. 
* In [6] the axiom is given in the form: Rt\Ct.(p)] => t = t', where Rt.(p) is interpreted as "p 
holds at the time t". The sentence mentioned above is in good consent with this sentence as far 
as meaning is concerned. 
In connection with the discussion of the order relation RT and the metric functions 
fT, gT it is necessary to add that when switching from one norm of decompositions 
of the class T to an another one at a certain level of decompositions a change in the 
character of the relation and the functions can be fell upon. For example it may be 
assumed that when subclasses of the type Tk'1 ordered by the relation RT in the class 
Tare decomposed further then the subclasses of the type Tk'l'° (obtained as products 
of the decomposition) may appear to be ordered by an another relations RT' and 
relevant time points (or intervals resp.) may refer to another metric functions fT', 
gT'. These changes of order relations and those of metric functions can be formulated 
in the languages by means of further postulates speaking about the fact that the 
topology and may be the metric of the ontologic structure is being changed within 
certain limits. One can feel that languages modified in this way could meet the demand 
of modern physics. 
III. 
We will deal with the problem of the identification of objects undergoing time 
changes in the next part of our discourse. The introductory discussion of problems 
connected with the willingness of keeping the Leidniz's ideas on identity when time 
changes of objects are described will be pursued further here. 
The following example is given in [6]. Let a, b be identical objects. Then it holds 
by Leibniz: 
(HI/1) VE(E(a) <-» F(b)). 
Suppose further that the object a posseses the property F at the time t, while the object 
b does not possess it: 
F(a), ~F(b), hence ~(a = b) which contradicts the sentence (Ill/l). 
Utilizing the way of formulation used in this discourse we can also write 
F(a, t)A ~F(b,t) 
A weakening of identity with respect to time is suggested by Rescuer in [6]: The 
following weakened concept of identity can be accepted according to it: 
a = b <-» VE Vt(F(a, t) ^ F(b, t)) . 
If the object b does not posses the property F at an another time /' i.e. 
F(a, t)A ~F(b,t') 
the contradiction is avoided now. 
Another trouble will be faced on the other hand when the following possibility 
is admitted: at all time points preceding i0 and at all time points following tt all 
properties of the objects a and b are equal; in the time interval <r0, ti> the objects 
differ in the property F (see Fig. 6). Let us suggest a still more weakened concept of 
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a = b*->3t VҒ(Ғ(Ű, /) «-» F(b, t)). 
All traditional laws of identity can not be deduced then yet. The identity treated 
in this way is no more transitive as illustrated by the scheme given in Fig. 7. It 
holds: a = b at t0, b = c at tu but it does not hold a = c at any time. 
Fig. 6. 
Fig. 7. 
Let us supply some notes to the reasonings taken from [6]. First of all it is obvious 
that the weakened treatment of identity is not identical with the Leibniz's one. So 
both terms defined must be denoted by distinct symbols. Let us define the notion 
of identity "relativized with respect to the time interval AttJ" in the following way: 
(D III/l) Def x = y «-> W VE(E(x, t) <-» F(y, t)) . 
Atij teAtij 
It is obvious that the "relativized identity" defined in this way gets along with the 
modified identity laws. From the definition axiom it can be deduced: 
VxV<d'(/x = x ) , 
At, j 
Vx Vj> V.df,/x = y-*y = x), 
Atij Atij 
Vx Vy Vz Wk0.((x = yAy = z)->x = z), 
Atu ^ ' U ^ ' i j 
Vx Vy Vz Vzlfy((x = z A j ; = z)->-x = y) , 
Attj Atij A'ij 
what appear to be the time relativized versions of identity laws. 
Let us place the following question now: is an object undergoing time changes 
identical with itself? The search for an answer to this question was characteristic 
for quite a number of various philosophical schools in the past. 
By tradition we identify an object by means of all its properties, what is well 
noticeable from the form of the definition of an individual: 
Def a = x <-• F(x) 
where F is a molecular predicate reflecting the union of all properties of the object 
whose name is being defined. 
The form of the corresponding definition axiom will certainly be: Vx VE(a = x <-»• 
+-> F(xj), where in the left part of the equivalence the traditional concept of identity 
is used. 
In a language with a time variable the axiom could be formulated as follows: 
Vx VE V/(a = x«-» F(x, t)). Suppose now that the object a will be changed in some 
of its properties in the course of time. Let us denote by ax and a2 two different 
phases of the changing object a. Let us suppose that the changing object is identical 
with itself: at = a2; but it holds at the same time: 3E 3tt 3t2(F(au tt) A ~F(a2, t2)) 
and hence by means of the definition axiom of identity contradiction can be drawn: 
(a. = a2)A ~(a , = a 2 ) . 
The paper [5] dealing with this sort of problems offers a suggestion of a weakened 
notion of identity that is based on substantial properties of identical objects here. 
In a simplified form*): 
Def x = y *-* VE(P(E) -+ (F(x) <->• F(y))) 
where the one place second order predicate constant P denotes the property of 
"being a substantial property". 
To make the defined weakened identity follow the laws of identity (the property 
of "being a substantial property" can change in the course of time itself: what is 
substantial now need not be substantial in future) let us relativize the identity with 
respect to a certain set of properties that remain to be substantial properties of the 
object concerned in all the time interval given. Thus a double relativization of identity 
is reached: one with respect to a given time interval, the other with respect to a given 
set of substantial properties: 
(D HI/2) Def x = p y <-* VE Vf (E(E, t) -» (E(x, t) — F(y, t))). 
Atij teAtij 
Double relativized versions of identity axioms can be drawn from the definition 
* In [5] multiplace predicates are dealt with as well. 
1«S axiom (DIII/2): 
VxVPVAliJx =ex), 
Ma 
Vx Vv VP VAuJx =p y-+y =p x), 
Atij Atij 
Wx Vj Vz VP VAt>j((x =F y A y =p z) -> x =p z) 
Atij Atij Atij 
Vx V.v Vz VP VAtij((x =p z A y =p z) -> x = p y ) . 
z)<ij /liij 4r , / 
In accordance with the concept of double relativization stated an object changing 
in time can be considered as "identical with itself" in a given time interval if its 
substantial properties remain unchanged throughout this interval: 
(III/2) VF Vf Vf. Vt2((P(F, t) - ((F(au . ,) .» F(a2, t2)) -> fll =
p a2)) 
t,t,,t2eAtij Atij 
for a given time interval and a given set of substantial properties. 
Under these circumstances the existence of nonsubstantial properties changing 
in this time interval can be described by the sentence: 
3G 3f' 3f"(~P(G , . ') A ~P(G, t") A G(au t') A ~G(a ? , t")) 
t' ,t"eAtij 
which — together with the sentence (HI/2) concerned with the "identity of an object 
with itself" — does not bring us to contradictions any more. 
The relativization of identity suggested is quite intuitive. Let us keep in mind that 
we consider as (pragmatically) substantial just those of the properties of an object 
undergoing changes that experience no chages in the given period and through 
which the object can enter relatively stable relations (important to us). 
If the suggested notion of identity is adopted the "motion paradoxes of identity" 
can be avoided and still the identity laws (in their relativized form) can be kept. 
At the same time a weak point of the approach suggested should be stated: it 
brings considerable complications of the syntactic structure of the language in ques-
tion. 
For the sake of individual time intervals and for individual given sets of substan-
tial properties the language is conservatively being enriched by definitions of further 
new predicate constants-notations of distinctly relativized identities. 
The "motion paradoxes of identity" will appear neither in a language in which 
names of time points are considered to be primitive constants (the "absolute approach 
to time") nor in the languages J", J? in which time terms (names of time points and 
time intervals) are introduced by definitions (the "relativistic approach to time") 
provided the identity is double relativized. Hence all these languages can be built up 
(from the point of view of avoiding the "identity paradoxes") on the classical logical 
base. 
Let us consider properties that do not belong to the set P. Suppose that two 
phases a l 5 a2 of a changing object are identical in the sence of (D HI/2) from the 
point of view of the property set P and the time interval A t{iJ. 
Let us consider a property A $ P, an object b undergoing changes in the limits 
of the interval AtUi. When the "relativistic approach to time" is adopted then the 
description of time changes of the object b obviously appears not to be a paradox 
only if the following condition is met: 
~3i-4>1L4(&., tkil) A ~AQ>U tktl)) 
tk.ieAtij 
The case when the condition is not met can be visualized in the manner given in Fig. 8 







If the relativistic approach to time is adopted, then no property can be changed 
within a time point. Certainly then the objects the time changes of which are being 
dealt with must not change continuously. What was said now refers to changes 
of metric magnitudes of properties too if these metric magnitudes of properties 
are understood to be classes — what is quite common nowadays. 
T k ' l=J. 





The condition given seems to be quite a strong requirement at the first sight. 
Let us keep in mind that every commonly used observatory or measuring apparatus 
by means of which we find whether a property of an object studied was changed 
or not has its precision limits characterized by its confidence interval. The following 
requirement can be drawn from this fact: It we are to avoid the "motion paradoxes" 
of the type F(a, t) A ~F(a, t) when describing time changes that are formulated 
in any of the languages J", JP from the standpoint of any property of an object, then 
the confidency interval that comes when any of these properties is measured must 
be "larger in its width" than is the "width" of any time point defined in this language 
by means of the respective class Tk'1. 
The requirement is quite intuitive (see Fig. 9). 
The formulation of the requirement given is far from being precise of course. 
What is the meaning of the "width of an interval" in comparison to the "time point 
width"? 
The form of the requirement can be made more precise under the assumption that 
metric additive properties and a metric additive time structure is being dealt width. 
Suppose that in the language J" or Jp the class Tk'1 by means of which the time 
point tkJ is defined is just equal to the confideney interval of the apparatus through 
which the changes of the property T of the chronometer C is observed. Let us consider 
the class TM as an interval of subclasses ordered by the relation RT in TkJ where 
the number of the subclasses in TkJ is increasing beyond any limits. Suppose Tt 
is the first, T2 is the last of all the subclasses. Let tu t2 be the time terms assigned 
to the classes Tu T2 by means of the definitions analoguous to that one assigning 
the term tkJ to the class T
kJ. 
Let further fA be a metrizing function mapping the magnitude of the property A 
in the class of numbers. 
Let JA be a numerically given confidency interval of the apparatus by means 
of which the magnitude of the property A of the object B is being measured in the 
given instant. 
Then for every property A, every object b and every interval TkJ it must hold 
|jr(tO - jr(t2)| = JT -> |TV(*. *i)) - fV(P. t»))\ < JA • 
The requirement stated is formulated in a metalanguage speaking about the 
language J" (JP resp.); unlimited decomposability of the basic subclass Tk'' is assumed. 
If the requirement is satisfied the motion paradoxes are avoided when nonsubstan-
tial properties are dealt with. Let us realize that the requirement implies the follow-
ing: along with any narrowing of the confidency interval the confidency interval 
of the "time" property T changes observation of the chronometer C must be made 
narrower too. If the last condition is not satisfied then there is a danger of paradoxes 
when informations on time changes are formulated in a given language; if we want 
to avoid the paradoxes in a language then it may appear necessary to rebuild, the 
language e.g. by switching to a nonclassical logical base (e.g. through the adoption 
of a third value for propositions "unstated" of the language) from the classical one. 
The papers [6; 7; 3; 4] should be mentioned at this place. 
In languages based on the "absolute approach to time" the requirement is satis-
fied in a trivial manner if the existence of time continuum is postulated there. In the 
other case (i.e. in the case of "discrete time") we may be forced to rebuild the language 
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of a more precise apparatus. It can be done so that we either postulate a "condensa-
tion" of the class of time points or we rebuild the logical base of the language (e.g. 
by switching from the classical logical base to the nonclassical one). 
IV. 
Our reasonings could be summarized as follows: 
1. When trying to describe time changes of objects in an exact language in which 
the Leibniz's treatment of identity is adopted we may come to well known para-
doxes leading to contradictions in the language. 
2. Time changes of objects are described by means of time terms in an exact lan-
guage. Time terms can be introduced as primitive constants in the language 
built. Special time postulates speak about the character of time structure in a model 
of the language then. Certain complication of the language universe that is non-
homogeneous from a certain standpoint appears to be a disadvantage of the 
construction. 
Time terms can be introduced in the language built by means of definitions too. 
In such a case language must have the term T series of terms T1, T2„..., T1 '*, T1 '2,... 
..., T2'1, T2'2,..., the term RT, the terms cv, c2, ... and the term C among its primitive 
constants. By means of them subsequent changes of a chosen property of a chrono-
meter C through which time points and intervals are defined, are described in the 
intended interpretation of the language. 
Time terms can be introduced in two ways. The first one refers to the "event 
approach to time" the other refers to the "process approach to time". It was shown 
that both ways in the introduction of time terms are idempotent for a language 
construction if an at most countable set of the type Tk'1 of subclasses of the class T 
is assumed. By means of specific postulates that refer to primitive terms RT and 
fT (gT resp.) a special topological and metric character of time structure can be 
assured in languages constructed. By the approach described some weak points 
of the "relativistic approach to time" spoken about by some authors earlier can be 
avoided. 
3. A concept of double relativized identity (i.e. that of identity relativized with res-
pect to a given set of substantial properties and with respect to a given time inter-
val) was suggested. By this concept basic laws of identity in their relativized 
form remain observed. This way "motion paradoxes of identity" of the type 
"an object is and is not identical with itself at a given time" are avoided. 
By a certain assumption concerned with the time structure of the language "motion 
paradoxes" drawing contradictions in exact languages and facing us with necessary 
170 changes in the logical base of the language can be avoided. The assumption was 
formulated for both the "relativistic" and the "absolute" approach to time. Time 
changes of physical objects can be described through empirical statements without 
paradoxes and without any need in change of classical logical base of the language 
if the assumption is satisfied. 
(Received October 22, 1975.) 
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